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Re: [atomic-devel] We are working on Roles Based Access Control for docker.



On Tue, 2015-03-31 at 17:02 -0400, Colin Walters wrote:
> On Tue, Mar 31, 2015, at 04:35 AM, Pavel Odvody wrote:
> 
> > It's supposed to work in the following way:
> > - docker daemon is started with the --trusted flag, this labels the
> > process as SELinux type 'docker_daemon_t', daemon also labels the
> > created Unix socket as 'docker_socket_t'. Define a policy that allows
> > only docker_daemon_t to talk to docker_socket_t. This ensures that the
> > daemon communicates only with compatible binary; other methods of
> > communication with the daemon have to be disabled (TCP).
> 
> But what domains can transition to docker_daemon_t ? Is e.g. unconfined_t -> docker_daemon_t a valid transition?  If so, we aren't gaining anything AFAICS.  If it's not, what domains can?
> 

The docker binary is originally labeled as docker_client_t, which is
also capable of talking to docker_socket_t.

> On Tue, Mar 31, 2015, at 04:35 AM, Pavel Odvody wrote:
> >
> > - each request that is sent from Docker Cli to the daemon is decorated
> > with 2 additional HTTP headers, UID/EUID of the user.
> 
> You really want instead to have docker use `getsockopt` with `SO_PEERCRED` when the socket connection is first set up.  Anything else is subject to forgery.
> 

That's nice! Didn't know about that one, sounds much better than pushing
HTTP headers around :)
Btw. the headers could not be forged, due to the policy constraints put
on the socket, but this one should also work with docker-py and similar
tools talking to the socket directly out of the box.


-- 
Pavel Odvody <podvody redhat com>
Software Engineer - EMEA ENG Developer Experience
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Red Hat Czech s.r.o., Purky┼łova 99/71, 612 45, Brno

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